Study their behaviors. Observe their territorial boundaries. Leave their habitat as you found it. Report any signs of intelligence.
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Sunday, November 09, 2008
The Patent Value Tax
I would consider modifying the bid-em-off-the-property provision in the same way that I would modify it for land (and maybe orbits but not spectrum). People who can't pay their tax can let it accumulate (with interest) as a lien against the eventual sale or transfer of the property, and the lien is capped at the market value of the property. However, market value of patents is harder to assess, and the escalating patent value tax rate would create an incentive to just let the tax accumulate and then abandon the patent when the rate is too high for anyone to want to bid for it. So I might worry that an undercapitalized inventor will not be able to defend a patent if he and a predatory bidder understand its value more than the market does (or else the inventor could get a loan from the understanding market). However again, I'm confident that markets are good enough at valuing patents that this wouldn't be a big problem.
So I don't yet see any problem with this idea. It could be applied to copyrights too, to the extent that one even believes in copyright.
Dan Sullivan wrote at dfc_talk:
Enter the patent value tax. The holder of a patent would be required to self-assess its value, with the stipulation that anyone could purchase the patent at that value. The purchaser would have to honor contracts into which the previous patent holder had entered, to the extent that he could not increase the royalty charge or impose other restrictions.
The contracts themselves would have to be public contracts. That is, if one producer is allowed to apply a patented invention to a particular type of product at a particular royalty rate, then all producers would be allowed to produce the same product at the same royalty rate.
For the first year a patent is granted, the tax rate could well be zero. It would then gradually increase until, at the year of expiration, it consumes nearly the entire amount of the patent's self-assessed value. Naturally, the value of the patent would decrease as the tax rate increases and the expiration date approaches.
Thursday, November 06, 2008
Samuelson's Theory of Public Goods
Excludability is the ability of producers to detect and prevent uncompensating consumption of their products. Rivalry is the inability of multiple consumers to consume the same good. A public good is defined as a non-rival non-excludable good, such as national defense. Because public goods are not excludable, they get under-produced. The pricing system cannot force consumers to reveal their demand for purely non-excludable goods, and so cannot force producers to meet that demand.
The evidence for under-production of public goods is so overwhelming that, as anarcholibertarian professor Walter Block admits about the resulting justification for state intervention, "virtually all economists accept this argument. There is not a single mainstream text dealing with the subject which demurs from it." For standard treatments, see e.g.
- Ch. 11 Public Goods and Common Resources in Principles of Economics by Greg Mankiw (Harvard economist fired as Chairman of White House Council of Economics for defending outsourcing).;
- The Free Rider Problem in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy;
- Public Goods and Externalities in the Concise Encyclopedia of Economics by Tyler Cowan (libertarian economist at GMU, co-blogger at Marginal Revolution).
- The 1939 generalization of Pareto optimality by Kaldor and Hicks to launch modern welfare economics;
- The 1950 formalization of the Prisoner's Dilemma and the subsequent avalanche of developments in game theory;
- Arrow's 1951 impossibility theorem, leading to Sen's 1970 liberal paradox;
- The 1953 discovery of the Allais paradox, and many subsequent discoveries about bounded rationality and cognitive bias and the development of Prospect Theory by Tversky and Khaneman in 1979;
- Tiebout's 1956 theorem about the optimal local provision of public goods;
- Coase's 1959 proof that markets can handle negative externalities only in the absence of transaction costs;
- The 1962 creation of public choice theory by Buchanan and Tullock; and
- Arrow's 1963 formalization of the problem of asymmetric information.
Friday, October 10, 2008
Twenty-First Century Political Economy
It's only lately seeping into the political world, but there actually has been unprecedented theoretical/scientific progress in the discipline of political economy in the latter decades of the 20th century. Thinkers have blathered about politics since before Aristotle without making any fundamental progress, but starting in the late 1950s academic economists have finally laid a sound theoretical foundation for analyzing the proper scope of government. Nobel Prizes have even been awarded for it. The theory is about how the analysis of market failure leads to a taxonomy of four kinds of goods: private, public, common, and club.
There is a joke that some people would do anything for the environment except take a science course. I add: some people would do anything for social progress except take an economics course. The standard liberal prescription is to create a centralized, non-scalable, byzantine mountain of regulations that tries to orchestrate hundreds of millions of people making tens of billions of decisions, and to constantly try to hand-tune the mountain to react to unintended consequences and to decide what groups/technologies/industries/etc. will be winners or losers. This will always be inferior to a decentralized, dynamic, scalable market-based approach that uses the pricing system to aggregate information and communicate incentives. The role of the government should just be to deter and punish force and fraud, and to correct market failure.
It's an open question whether democracy can work after majorities discover they can vote themselves money taken from other people. The theory of government failure is called Public Choice Theory, and while it too was only created in the last half-century, it has not yet given us any firm guidance on how to design institutions to prevent government failure. The findings so far from Public Choice Theory are very depressing. They demonstrate that voters have systematic incentives to deceive/delude themselves and to let politicians assist in the process. The best answer we have so far is to diffuse and decentralize government power as much as practical, so that jurisdictions compete with each other and people can vote with their feet if necessary.
Thursday, October 09, 2008
A Bailout Hair Of The Moral Hazard Dog That Bit You
The current mortgage crisis is the direct and predictable result of the government protecting borrowers and lenders from their own unwise choices. Only one party in America — the Libertarian Party — is willing to say who caused this crisis and to consistently follow the principle of holding such people responsible for their own choices.
Most importantly, we already have a mechanism to punish the politicians who worked so hard to help create this mess — it’s called an election. This November, don’t bail out the incumbents who are using your tax dollars to bail out their irresponsible friends on Wall Street. Instead, vote for the only party in America that believes people should be free to make their own choices in their personal and economic lives — and should bear the responsibility for those choices. Vote Libertarian, and send the message that Washington should be in nobody’s pocket.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Vote Smart Cheat Sheet
Abortion
Taxpayers should not be forced to pay for other people's abortions, nor should any government or individual force a woman to have an abortion. Most Americans believe that a fetus starts deserving legal protection sometime after the first trimester but before birth. I support the right to terminate one's pregnancy during the first trimester. I do not oppose requirements that ending a pregnancy in the third trimester must leave a healthy fetus alive if that is feasible.
Budget Priorities
Defense Spending
Income Taxes
Other Taxes
Tax Preferences
Other Principles of Government Finance
Political Reform
Crime
Education
Employment
Environment/Energy
Guns
Health
Immigration
International Aid
Iraq
International Policy
International Trade
National Security
Social Issues
Social Security
Welfare and Poverty
Priorities